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The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis

Author

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  • Yaron Hollander

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  • Joseph Prashker

    ()

Abstract

Various models that incorporate concepts from Non-Cooperative Game Theory (NCGT) are described in the transport literature. Game Theory provides powerful tools for analysing transport systems, but these tools have some drawbacks that should be recognised. In the current paper we review games that describe transport problems and discuss them within a uniform context. Although the paper does not introduce new tools, it presents insights concerning the relations between transport models and games. We divide existing games into groups and show that some common features characterise multiple games. We distinguish between games that make a conceptual contribution and games that are suitable for application. Compact or symmetric game structures make remarkable observations but often do not support actual decision-making. Less aesthetic formats, most of which are Stackelberg games between authorities and travellers, are stronger as instruments that assist in determining real-life policies; these formulations can be treated by practitioners as mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints and not as games. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Yaron Hollander & Joseph Prashker, 2006. "The applicability of non-cooperative game theory in transport analysis," Transportation, Springer, vol. 33(5), pages 481-496, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:transp:v:33:y:2006:i:5:p:481-496
    DOI: 10.1007/s11116-006-0009-1
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11116-006-0009-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Levinson, David, 2005. "Micro-foundations of congestion and pricing: A game theory perspective," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 691-704.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Janusch, Nicholas, 2016. "A note on the distortionary effects of revenue-neutral tolls in a bottleneck congestion game," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 95-103.
    2. Perea, Federico & Puerto, Justo, 2013. "Revisiting a game theoretic framework for the robust railway network design against intentional attacks," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 226(2), pages 286-292.
    3. Hernández, Daniel & Muñoz, Juan Carlos & Giesen, Ricardo & Delgado, Felipe, 2015. "Analysis of real-time control strategies in a corridor with multiple bus services," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 83-105.
    4. Laporte, Gilbert & Mesa, Juan A. & Perea, Federico, 2010. "A game theoretic framework for the robust railway transit network design problem," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 44(4), pages 447-459, May.
    5. Silvia Schwarze, 2016. "Pricing strategies for the site-dependent vehicle routing problem," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(1), pages 137-173, January.
    6. Sebastián Marbán & Peter Ven & Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers, 2013. "ALOHA networks: a game-theoretic approach," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 78(2), pages 221-242, October.
    7. repec:spr:compst:v:78:y:2013:i:2:p:221-242 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Chidambaram, Bhuvanachithra & Janssen, Marco A. & Rommel, Jens & Zikos, Dimitrios, 2014. "Commuters’ mode choice as a coordination problem: A framed field experiment on traffic policy in Hyderabad, India," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 9-22.
    9. Evers, Ruth & Proost, Stef, 2015. "Optimizing intersections," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 100-119.
    10. repec:eee:ejores:v:266:y:2018:i:2:p:543-553 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Ishii, Masahiro & Lee, Paul Tae-Woo & Tezuka, Koichiro & Chang, Young-Tae, 2013. "A game theoretical analysis of port competition," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 92-106.
    12. Dadkar, Yashoda & Nozick, Linda & Jones, Dean, 2010. "Optimizing facility use restrictions for the movement of hazardous materials," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 267-281, February.
    13. Hejun Kang & Darren Scott, 2008. "An integrated spatio-temporal GIS toolkit for exploring intra-household interactions," Transportation, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 253-268, March.
    14. Reilly, Allison & Nozick, Linda & Xu, Ningxiong & Jones, Dean, 2012. "Game theory-based identification of facility use restrictions for the movement of hazardous materials under terrorist threat," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 115-131.
    15. repec:eee:phsmap:v:490:y:2018:i:c:p:386-401 is not listed on IDEAS

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