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``Frenemy'' of Two Giants: Amazon and Apple

Author

Listed:
  • Muxin Li

    (IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy)

  • Ksenia Shakhgildyan

    (Economics Department and IGIER, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy)

Abstract

We study the competitive effects of the 2018 Apple–Amazon brand-gating agreement, which restricted sales of Apple products on Amazon to a small set of authorized resellers while granting Amazon privileged access to Apple’s portfolio. Using cross-country panel data and dynamic difference-in-difference and triple-differences designs, we document three main findings: (i) a sharp decline in seller participation and product variety, (ii) a substantial increase in Amazon’s Buy Box share and prices, and (iii) no significant improvement in product quality or evidence of counterfeit removal. The results suggest that the agreement reduced intra-brand competition and consumer welfare while reinforcing Amazon’s gatekeeping position, raising concerns for antitrust enforcement and digital platform regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Muxin Li & Ksenia Shakhgildyan, 2025. "``Frenemy'' of Two Giants: Amazon and Apple," Working Papers 25-06, NET Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:2506
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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