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Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases

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  • Motta, Massimo

Abstract

Antitrust agencies all over the world have been investigating large digital platforms for practices which may constitute an abuse of dominance. Here I discuss practices (including ‘self-preferencing’ and denial or degradation of interoperability) which can be interpreted as foreclosure in vertically-related or complementary markets. I discuss, in particular, a few high-profile cases involving Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google. I focus on possible theories of harm for such cases and show that both original simple models and well-established economic theories (adapted or interpreted) provide a rationale for anti-competitive foreclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Motta, Massimo, 2023. "Self-preferencing and foreclosure in digital markets: Theories of harm for abuse cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:90:y:2023:i:c:s0167718723000553
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102974
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole, 1990. "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 21(1990 Micr), pages 205-286.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-preferencing; Abuse of dominance; Monopolization; Exclusionary practices; Digital platforms; Two-sided markets; Vertical foreclosure;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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