Voting Rights, Share Concentration, and Leverage at Nineteenth-Century US Banks
Studies of corporate governance are concerned with two features of modern shareholding: diffuse ownership and the resulting separation of ownership and control, which potentially leads to managerial self-dealing; and, majority shareholding, which potentially mitigates some managerial self-dealing but opens the door for the expropriation of minority shareholders. This paper provides a study of the second issue for nineteenth-century US corporations. It investigates two related questions. First, did voting rules that limited the control rights of large shareholders encourage diffuse ownership? It did. Second, did diffuse ownership systematically alter bank risk taking? It did. Banks with less concentrated ownership followed policies that reduced liquidity and bankruptcy risk.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as “Voting Rights, Share Concentration, and Leverage in Nineteenth-Century US Banks.” Journal of Law & Economics 57 (May 2014 forthcoming).|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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