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Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa

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  • Robert P. Inman
  • Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Abstract

We present a model of a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy using federal governance as a constitutional means to protect the economic interests of the once ruling elite. Under "democratic federalism" the constitution creates an annual policy game where the new majority and the elite each control one policy instrument of importance to the other. The game has a stable, stationary equilibrium that the elite may prefer to autocratic rule. We apply our analysis to South Africa's transition from white, elite rule under apartheid to a multi-racial democracy. We calibrate our model to the South African economy at the time of the transition. Stable democratic equilibria exist for plausible estimates of redistributive preferences and rate of time preference ('impatience') of the new majority during the early years of the new democracy. The future of the democratic federal bargain is less certain under the new populist presidency of Jacob Zuma.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2008. "Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa," NBER Working Papers 13733, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13733
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel, 2009. "Federalism and South Africa's Democratic Bargain: The Zuma Challenge," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt6239g0gb, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
    3. Kumar, Vikas, 2011. "Negotiating constitutions for political unions," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 58-76, March.
    4. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 2012. "Understanding the Democratic Transition in South Africa," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4mp5t4ff, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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