IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v33y2005i1p171-191.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda

Author

Listed:
  • Deininger, Klaus
  • Mpuga, Paul

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2005. "Does Greater Accountability Improve the Quality of Public Service Delivery? Evidence from Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 171-191, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:33:y:2005:i:1:p:171-191
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305-750X(04)00182-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philipp Harms & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2002. "Do Civil and Political Repression Really Boost Foreign Direct Investments?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 651-663, October.
    2. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
    3. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2004. "The power of information : evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3239, The World Bank.
    4. Bengoa, Marta & Sanchez-Robles, Blanca, 2003. "Foreign direct investment, economic freedom and growth: new evidence from Latin America," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 529-545, September.
    5. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    6. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    7. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 25-35, October.
    8. Francis, Paul & James, Robert, 2003. "Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The Contradictions of Uganda's Decentralization Program," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 325-337, February.
    9. Ebrahim, Alnoor, 2003. "Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 813-829, May.
    10. Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2002. "Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 325-345, March.
    11. repec:hrv:faseco:30747190 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    13. Nugent, Jeffrey B & Robinson, James A, 2002. "Are Endowments Fate?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-1042, July.
    15. Harry Broadman & Francesca Recanatini, 2002. "Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 37-49.
    16. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World; Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Stephen Knack, 2001. "Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 310-329, October.
    18. Ellis, Frank & Bahiigwa, Godfrey, 2003. "Livelihoods and Rural Poverty Reduction in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 997-1013, June.
    19. Mo, Pak Hung, 2001. "Corruption and Economic Growth," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 66-79, March.
    20. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    21. James May & William Pyle & Paul Sommers, 2002. "Does Governance Explain Unofficial Activity?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0201, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    22. Feld, Lars P. & Voigt, Stefan, 2003. "Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 497-527, September.
    23. Esfahani, Hadi Salehi & Ramirez, Maria Teresa, 2003. "Institutions, infrastructure, and economic growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 443-477, April.
    24. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
    25. Joshua D. Angrist, 1991. "Instrumental Variables Estimation of Average Treatment Effects in Econometrics and Epidemiology," NBER Technical Working Papers 0115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    26. Javorcik, Beata & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-Level Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    27. Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz & Luis A. Rivera-Batiz, 2018. "Democracy, Governance, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade, Capital Flows and Economic Development, chapter 8, pages 215-248 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    28. Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Understanding Underdevelopment: Challenges for Institutional Economics from the Point of View of Poor Countries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(1), pages 216-216, March.
    29. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
    30. Peter Eigen, 2002. "Measuring and combating corruption," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 187-201.
    31. Mauro, Paolo, 1998. "Corruption and the composition of government expenditure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 263-279, June.
    32. Friedman, Eric & Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 2000. "Dodging the grabbing hand: the determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 459-493, June.
    33. Deininger, Klaus & Mpuga, Paul, 2004. "Economic and Welfare Effects of the Abolition of Health User Fees : Evidence from Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3276, The World Bank.
    34. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    35. Stromberg, David, 2001. "Mass media and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 652-663, May.
    36. Karoll Gómez Portilla & Santiago Gallón Gómez, 2002. "El impacto de la corrupcion sobre el crecimiento economico colombiano, 1990-1999," Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía, issue 57, pages 49-86, Julio - D.
    37. Deininger, Klaus, 2003. "Does cost of schooling affect enrollment by the poor? Universal primary education in Uganda," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 291-305, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    2. Klaus Deininger & Daniel Ayalew Ali & Takashi Yamano, 2008. "Legal Knowledge and Economic Development: The Case of Land Rights in Uganda," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(4), pages 593-619.
    3. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, "undated". "A Quantitative Exploration of the Golden Age of European Growth: Structural Change, Public Investment, the Marshall Plan and Intra-European Trade," Working Papers UWEC-2004-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    4. Jennifer Hunt, 2007. "Bribery in Health Care in Peru and Uganda," NBER Working Papers 13034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Susan Steiner, 2005. "Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction: A Conceptual Framework for the Economic Impact," Public Economics 0508006, EconWPA.
    7. Susan Steiner, 2006. "Decentralisation in Uganda: Exploring the Constraints for Poverty Reduction," GIGA Working Paper Series 31, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    8. Ronelle Burger & Canh Thien Dang & Trudy Owens, 2017. "Better performing NGOs do report more accurately: Evidence from investigating Ugandan NGO financial accounts," Discussion Papers 2017-10, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    9. Wong, Ho Lun & Luo, Renfu & Zhang, Linxiu & Rozelle, Scott, 2013. "Providing quality infrastructure in rural villages: The case of rural roads in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 262-274.
    10. Joseph J. Capuno & Stella A. Quimbo & Aleli D. Kraft & Carlos Antonio R. Tan, Jr., 2012. "The effects of term limits and yardstick competition on local government provision of health insurance and other public services : The Philippine case," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201201, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    11. Joseph J. Capuno & Stella A. Quimbo & Aleli D. Kraft & Carlos Antonio R. Tan, Jr. & Vigile Marie B. Fabella, 2012. "Perks and public provisions : Effects of yardstick competition on local government fiscal behavior in the Philippines," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201208, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    12. Tim Wegenast, 2010. "Uninformed Voters for Sale: Electoral Competition, Information and Interest Groups in the US," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 271-300, May.
    13. Konte Maty, 2017. "Working Paper 278 - Education resources and the quality of local governance in Africa," Working Paper Series 2395, African Development Bank.
    14. Winters, Matthew S. & Karim, Abdul Gaffar & Martawardaya, Berly, 2014. "Public Service Provision under Conditions of Insufficient Citizen Demand: Insights from the Urban Sanitation Sector in Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 31-42.
    15. Kuppens, Miet, 2016. "Exploring the social accountability concept: a literature review," IOB Working Papers 2016.06, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    16. Godwin Awio & Deryl Northcott & Stewart Lawrence, 2011. "Social capital and accountability in grass-roots NGOs: The case of the Ugandan community-led HIV/AIDS initiative," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 63-92, January.
    17. Ling, Cristina & Roberts, Dawn, 2014. "Evidence of development impact from institutional change : a review of the evidence on open budgeting," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6968, The World Bank.
    18. Geginat, Carolin & Saltane, Valentina, 2016. "“Open for Business?” —Transparent government and business regulation," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 1-21.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:33:y:2005:i:1:p:171-191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.