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Establishing Credibility: The Role of Foreign Advisors

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  • Sebastian Edwards

Abstract

In this paper I analyze the role of foreign advisors in stabilization programs. I discuss from an analytical perspective why foreigners may help a developing country's government put in place a successful stabilization program. This framework is used to analyze Chile's experience with anti-inflationary policies in the mid 1950s. In 1955-58 Chile implemented a stabilization package with the advice of the U.S. consulting firm of Klein-Saks. The Klein-Saks program took place in a period of acute political confrontation. After what was considered to be an initial success -- inflation declined from 85% in 1955 to 17% in 1957 -- the program failed to achieve durable price stability. I argue that the foreign advisors of the Klein-Saks Mission gave initial credibility to the stabilization program launched in 1955. But providing initial credibility was not enough to ensure success. Congress failed to act decisively on the fiscal front. Consequently the fiscal imbalances that had plagued Chile for a long time were reduced, but not eliminated. I present empirical results on the evolution of inflation, exchange rates and interest rates that support my historical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Edwards, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: The Role of Foreign Advisors," NBER Working Papers 11429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11429
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rudiger Dornbusch, 1991. "Credibility and Stabilization," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 837-850.
    2. Thomas J. Sargent, 1982. "The Ends of Four Big Inflations," NBER Chapters, in: Inflation: Causes and Effects, pages 41-98, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rudiger Dornbusch & Stanley Fischer, 1986. "Stopping hyperinflations past and present," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 122(1), pages 1-47, March.
    4. Sebastian Edwards & Peter J. Montiel, 1989. "Devaluation Crises and the Macroeconomic Consequences of Postponed Adjustment in Developing Countries," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 36(4), pages 875-903, December.
    5. Mankiw, N Gregory & Miron, Jeffrey A & Weil, David N, 1987. "The Adjustment of Expectations to a Change in Regime: A Study of the Founding of the Federal Reserve," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 358-374, June.
    6. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-555, June.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Credibility and politics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 542-550, March.
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements

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