IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries

Applying regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 using new indicators, we find that right-wing governments liberalize more the financial sector that left-wing governments. We show that if a left-wing government accepts to liberalize the financial sector, an increase of social security expenditures can facilitate the adoption of a new legislation in the financial sector. To estimate the impact of the government partisan affiliation on the corporate governance legislation, we use a probit model and a conditional Cox model in gap time in 16 OECD over the 1970-2009 period. Statistically, we find that right-wing governments enhance more pro-shareholder policies.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 11063.

in new window

Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11063
Contact details of provider: Postal: 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS CEDEX 13
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Jan Schumacher, 2006. "Welfare-State Retrenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 426-444, Autumn.
  2. Donatella GATTI & Christophe RAULT & Anne-Gaël VAUBOURG, 2009. "Unemployment and finance : how do financial and labour market factors interact ?," Working Papers 101, Orleans Economic Laboratorys, University of Orleans.
  3. Reinhard H. Schmidt, 2004. "Corporate Governance in Germany: An Economic Perspective," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 118, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
  4. Alesina, Alberto, 1987. "Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game," Scholarly Articles 4552531, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  5. Economides, N. & Hubbard, R.G. & Palia, D., 1995. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition Among Small and Large Banks," Papers 95-14, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  6. Ashoka Mody & Abdul Abiad, 2003. "Financial Reform: What Shakes it? What Shapes it?," IMF Working Papers 03/70, International Monetary Fund.
  7. Gérard Charreaux & Peter Wirtz, 2007. "Corporate Governance in France," Post-Print halshs-00260121, HAL.
  8. Roe, Mark J., 2002. "Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199240746.
  9. repec:hal:journl:hal-00185083 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. repec:hal:psewpa:halshs-00586260 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Brian Burgoon & Panicos Demetriades & Geoffrey R D Underhill, 2008. "Financial Liberalisation and Political Variables: a response to Abiad and Mody," WEF Working Papers 0039, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
  12. Putnam, Robert D., 1988. "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 427-460, June.
  13. Hall, Peter A. & Soskice, David (ed.), 2001. "Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247752.
  14. Amable, Bruno, 2003. "The Diversity of Modern Capitalism," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199261147.
  15. Barker, Roger M., 2010. "Corporate Governance, Competition, and Political Parties: Explaining Corporate Governance Change in Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199576814.
  16. Elvire Guillaud, 2008. "Preferences for redistribution: a European comparative analysis," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00586260, HAL.
  17. Bruno Amable & Stefano Palombarini, 2009. "A neorealist approach to institutional change and the diversity of capitalism," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00345887, HAL.
  18. Mark J. Roe, 1997. "The Political Roots Of American Corporate Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(4), pages 8-22.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:11063. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.