IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tax competition and the move from insurance to assistance

The funding of social protection has strongly evolved in Bismarckian countries : whereas social protection used to rely on social contributions, since the 1990s most of the new expenditures have been funded through taxation, leading to a more balanced mix in the structure of social protection revenue. I propose a formal model in which two social protection systems may coexist : insurance and assistance. Insurance level is set by consensus between firms and unions, whereas assistance expenditures are set by a majority vote in parliament. Social insurance can be manipulated to influence preferences in respect of assistance. It is shown how an exogenous increase in tax competition in a Bismarckian context can lead to the emergence of a mixed model : assistance increases to complement existing insurance, not to replace it. A time series cross-section analysis on 9 countries over 25 years supports the idea that a drop in corporate tax rates can trigger a shift in the tax structure of social protection funding.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12090.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne in its series Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne with number 12090.

as
in new window

Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12090
Contact details of provider: Postal: 106-112 boulevard de l'Hôpital 75 647 PARIS CEDEX 13
Phone: + 33 44 07 81 00
Fax: + 33 1 44 07 83 01
Web page: http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith & Alexander Klemm, 2002. "Corporate income tax reforms and international tax competition," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 17(35), pages 449-495, October.
  2. Jacques Le Cacheux, 2002. "Mondialisation économique et financière : de quelques poncifs, idées fausses et vérités," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(5), pages 19-46.
  3. Genschel, Philipp, 2004. "Globalisation and the welfare state: A retrospective," TranState Working Papers 3, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
  4. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti, 2005. "The political economy of job protection and income redistribution," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590841, HAL.
  5. Beck, Nathaniel & Katz, Jonathan N., . "Modeling dynamics in time-series-cross-section political economy data," Working Papers 1304, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 1998. "The political economy of targeting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 177-200, April.
  7. Conde-Ruiz, J.I. & Galasso, V., 2000. "Positive Arithmetic of the Welfare State," Economics Working Papers eco2000/23, European University Institute.
  8. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, ‘profit shifting’ FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 122-133.
  9. Tom Karkinsky & Nadine Riedel, 2009. "Corporate Taxation and the Choice of Patent Location within Multinational Firms," Working Papers 0931, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  10. Bruno Amable & Donatella Gatti & Jan Schumacher, 2006. "Welfare state retrenchment: The partisan effect revisited," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590537, HAL.
  11. Stéphane Gauthier, 2009. "Un exercice de TVA sociale," Post-Print hal-00731155, HAL.
  12. Jacques Le Cacheux & Thierry Madiès & Réjane Hugounenq, 1999. "Diversité des fiscalités européennes et risques de concurrence fiscale," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 63-109.
  13. Lee, Dwight R. & McKenzie, Richard B., 1989. "The International Political Economy of Declining Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 42(1), pages 79-83, March.
  14. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1998. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Seminar Papers 661, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  15. Bonoli, Giuliano & Palier, Bruno, 2000. "How do welfare states change? Institutions and their impact on the politics of welfare state reform in Western Europe," European Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(03), pages 333-352, July.
  16. James R. Hines, 2006. "Will Social Welfare Expenditures Survive Tax Competition?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 330-348, Autumn.
  17. Gaël Dupont & Henri Sterdyniak & Jacques Le Cacheux & Vincent Touze, 2000. "La réforme fiscale en France : bilan et perspectives," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2092, Sciences Po.
  18. Duane Swank, 1998. "Funding the Welfare State: Globalization and the Taxation of Business in Advanced Market Economies," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 46(4), pages 671-692, 09.
  19. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Paola Profeta, 2007. "The Redistributive Design of Social Security Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(520), pages 686-712, 04.
  20. Osterloh, Steffen & Debus, Marc, 2012. "Partisan politics in corporate taxation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 192-207.
  21. Cassette, Aurélie & Paty, Sonia, 2008. "Tax competition among Eastern and Western European countries: With whom do countries compete?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 307-325, December.
  22. Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, 2004. "Random Coefficient models for time-series-cross-section data," Working Papers 1205, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  23. Julie Collins & Douglas Shackelford, 1995. "Corporate domicile and average effective tax rates: The cases of Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 55-83, February.
  24. Peter Schwarz, 2007. "Does capital mobility reduce the corporate-labor tax ratio?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 363-380, March.
  25. Slemrod, Joel, 2004. "Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1169-1186, June.
  26. Jacques Le Cacheux, 2006. "Réformer la fiscalité française pour faire face à la concurrence fiscale," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 81-88.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12090. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.