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Corporate governance reforms and political partisanship: an empirical analysis in 16 OECD countries

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  • Thibault Darcillon

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This paper explores the determinants of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. Using a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new empirical evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms at the firm level and government ideological affiliation in 16 OECD countries over the period 1970–2009. I find strong evidence linking rightward shifts in government ideological orientation with the adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. This result supports our argument that changes in the composition of the coalition of heterogeneous interests and/or a change in the expectations of the parties' constituency will affect government strategy on the adoption of pro-minority shareholder corporate governance reforms. I also find that the macroeconomic context at the international level may influence the adoption of these reforms. Our findings suggest that international economic integration has resulted not in the convergence of corporate governance regimes to the Anglo-Saxon model, but rather the emergence of hybrid corporate governance systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Thibault Darcillon, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms and political partisanship: an empirical analysis in 16 OECD countries," Post-Print hal-01248942, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01248942
    DOI: 10.1515/bap-2014-0043
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