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Social information and bandwagon behaviour in voting: an economic experiment

  • Ivo Bischoff

    ()

    (University of Kassel)

  • Henrik Egbert

    ()

    (University of Gießen)

We present an economic experiment on the impact of social information on voter behaviour and find strong support for bandwagon behaviour in voting decisions. In total, 418 subjects participated in the experiment. Bandwagon behaviour is found among both male and female subjects.

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File URL: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/05-2010_bischoff.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201005.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201005
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