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Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections

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  • Fleitas, Daniel W.

Abstract

This investigation is based on an experimental study of voting behavior in what the author terms a minimal-information election. This type of election is characterized by a dearth of public information about election issues and partisan considerations, so that the campaign is waged primarily on the basis of the voters' attitudes toward the candidates as personalities. In general, the minimal-information election most often characterizes local nonpartisan contests. The experiment examined changes in voting that appeared to result from electioneering strategies designed to elicit “bandwagon†or “underdog†responses. These strategies consisted of presenting the “electorate†with the results of pre-election preferential polls, as well as qualitative information explicitly aimed at arousing the emotions of the voters. The experiment clearly demonstrated that mere poll results are insufficient to impel would-be bandwagon or underdog identifiers to switch their votes. Rather, this type of behavior does not appear until a strong qualitative stimulus sensitizes or cues bandwagon or underdog tendencies among the voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Fleitas, Daniel W., 1971. "Bandwagon and Underdog Effects in Minimal-Information Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 65(2), pages 434-438, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:65:y:1971:i:02:p:434-438_13
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    1. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    2. May Elsayyad & Shima’a Hanafy, 2014. "Voting Islamist or voting secular? An empirical analysis of voting outcomes in Egypt’s “Arab Spring”," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 109-130, July.
    3. Manfred Gartner, 1976. "Endogenous bandwagon and underdog effects in a rational choice model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 83-89, March.
    4. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    5. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage, 2019. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03393084, HAL.
    6. Cagé, Julia & Bekkouche, Yasmine, 2018. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from France, 1993-2014," CEPR Discussion Papers 12614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Morton, Rebecca B. & Ou, Kai, 2015. "What motivates bandwagon voting behavior: Altruism or a desire to win?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 224-241.
    8. May Elsayyad & Shima’a Hanafy, 2013. "Voting Islamist or Voting secular? An empirical analysis of Voting Outcomes in "Arab Spring" Egypt," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2013-01, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    9. Robert Hodgson & John Maloney, 2013. "Bandwagon effects in British elections, 1885–1910," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 73-90, October.
    10. Somdeep Chatterjee & Jai Kamal, 2021. "Voting for the underdog or jumping on the bandwagon? Evidence from India’s exit poll ban," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 431-453, September.
    11. Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, 2010. "Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and Welfare: An Experimental Study," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 700-717, July.
    12. May Elsayyad & Shima'a Hanafy, 2012. "Voting Islamist or Voting secular? An empirical analysis of Voting Outcomes in “Arab Spring” Egypt," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201251, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    13. Bischoff, Ivo & Egbert, Henrik, 2013. "Social information and bandwagon behavior in voting: An economic experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 270-284.
    14. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    15. Aristotelis Boukouras & Will Jennings & Lunzheng Li & Zacharias Maniadis, 2019. "Can Biased Polls Distort Electoral Results? Evidence From The Lab And The Field," Discussion Papers in Economics 19/06, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    16. Boukouras, Aristotelis & Jennings, Will & Li, Lunzheng & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2023. "Can biased polls distort electoral results? Evidence from the lab," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    17. David Dillenberger & Colin Raymond, 2016. "Group-Shift and the Consensus Effect, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Sep 2016.
    18. Jerry Medler & Donald Tull, 1973. "Poll positions and win probabilities: a stochastic model of the electoral process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 125-132, March.
    19. Jost, John T. & Jimenez, Maria C. & Kay, Aaron C., 2001. "Sour Grapes and Sweet Lemons: The Rationalization of Anticipated Electoral Outcomes," Research Papers 1680, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    21. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2ahul47tb09rvqfl9eelv7o5ca is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Stock, Carolin & Gierl, Heribert, 2015. "Does information about the underdog biography of company founders affect brand evaluations?," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 69(1), pages 2-24.
    23. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10lirmbd5p8h4ae52oi51b4cka is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Yasmine Bekkouche & Julia Cage & Edgard Dewitte, 2022. "The Heterogeneous Price of a Vote: Evidence from Multiparty Systems, 1993-2017," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03389172, HAL.

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