IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

What Drives Corruption? Evidence from North African Firms

  • Clara Delavallade

    ()

    (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town)

We estimate the effect of the child support grant on mothers' labour supply in South Africa. Identification is based on the use of specific samples, such as black mothers, aged 20 to 45, whose youngest child is aged within 2 years of the age eligibility cut-off, and unanticipated variation over the years in the age eligibility cut-off. Balancing tests across the age cut-o s are used to show that there are no signi cant di erences between mothers of eligible and ineligible children in the samples used, over the years. Different techniques are used to estimate the effect of the child support grant from many angles, including simple OLS as a bench mark, a difference in difference estimator, using appropriately constructed treatment and control groups, instrumental variables estimates, and descriptive analysis. The effect of having an age eligible child is large. Mothers who become recipients in their twenties see an average increase in employment probability of 15%, and in labour force participation of 9%. Many robustness and specification checks are used, including placebo regressions in the pre-treatment years, to ensure the estimated effect is not due to age or another variable.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/home/index.php?/component/option,com_docman/Itemid,32/gid,410/task,doc_download/
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Article not found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Alison Siljeur)


File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town in its series SALDRU Working Papers with number 68.

as
in new window

Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ldr:wpaper:68
Contact details of provider: Postal: Leslie Social Science Building, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701
Phone: +27 21 650 5696
Fax: +27 21 650 5697
Web page: http://www.saldru.uct.ac.za/Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
  2. Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Seminar Papers 713, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  3. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
  4. Gauthier, Bernard & Gersovitz, Mark, 1997. "Revenue erosion through exemption and evasion in Cameroon, 1993," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 407-424, June.
  5. Ekaterina Vostroknutova, 2003. "Shadow Economy, Rent-Seeking Activities and the Perils of Reinforcement of the Rule of Law," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-578, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  6. Bernard Gauthier & Jean-Paul Azam & Jonathan Goyette, 2004. "The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence," Cahiers de recherche 04-10, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
  7. Clarke, George, 2008. "How petty is petty corruption? Evidence from firm survey in Africa," MPRA Paper 15073, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2008.
  8. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, 1997. "The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 45(3), pages 496-515.
  9. Gauthier, Bernard & Reinikka, Ritva, 2001. "Shifting tax burdens through exemptions and evasion - an empirical investigation of Uganda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2735, The World Bank.
  10. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  11. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World; Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Working Papers 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
  13. Frye, Timothy & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2000. "Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 478-502, October.
  14. Bardhan, Pranab, 2006. "The economist's approach to the problem of corruption," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 341-348, February.
  15. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
  16. Deaton, Angus, 1985. "Panel data from time series of cross-sections," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 109-126.
  17. Laszlo Goerke, 2006. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 1666, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
  19. Clarke, George R. G. & Lixin Colin Xu, 2002. "Ownership, competition, and corruption : bribe takers versus bribe payers," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2783, The World Bank.
  20. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3071, The World Bank.
  21. Ira N. Gang & Amal Sanyal & Omkar Goswami, 1998. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Departmental Working Papers 199604, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  22. Douglas Hibbs & Violeta Piculescu, 2005. "Institutions, Corruption and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy," Public Economics 0508003, EconWPA.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ldr:wpaper:68. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alison Siljeur)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.