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Firmes industrielles concurrence et corruption
[Industrial firms competition and corruption]


  • Jellal, Mohamed


This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in fostering corruption. Therfore, this endemic corruption can explain the lack of productive performance of industrial . Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth

Suggested Citation

  • Jellal, Mohamed, 2014. "Firmes industrielles concurrence et corruption
    [Industrial firms competition and corruption]
    ," MPRA Paper 57284, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57284

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37.
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    7. Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-1023, October.
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    9. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-1042, July.
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    More about this item


    Industrial Firms ; Competition ; Tax Evasion ; Corruption; Rents; competition policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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