Rentes et corruption au maroc théorie et evidence
[Morocco rents and corruption theory and evidence]
This paper is part of a large research agenda by our Institute on the causes and consequences of moroccan corruption . This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the main determinants of firms corruption in Morocco firms in the formal sector. It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is fundamental in explaining corruption. This endemic corruption can then explain the lack of productive performance of Moroccan firms. Institutional reforms would greatly be desirable to encourage efficiency in the industrial sector which is the main engine of economic growth.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andre Shleifer, 2000.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1904, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "The Regulation of Entry," Working Paper Series rwp01-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000. "The Regulation of Entry," NBER Working Papers 7892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & López-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001. "The Regulation of Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 2953, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Entry," Working Paper 19462, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Shleifer, Andrei & Lopez de Silanes, Florencio, 2001. "The regulation of entry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2661, The World Bank.
- Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999.
"Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
- Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2003. "Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism," Public Economics 0308004, EconWPA.
- Daniel Kaufmann & Pedro C. Vicente, 2011.
Economics and Politics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 195-219, 07.
- Banerjee, A.V., 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," Working papers 97-4, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2008.
"Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion,"
Economics of Governance,
Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
- Emerson, Patrick M., 2006. "Corruption, competition and democracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 193-212, October.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. " Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
- Clara Delavallade, 2006. "Corruption and distribution of public spending in developing countries," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 222-239, June.
- Banfield, Edward C, 1975. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 587-605, December.
- Bliss, Christopher & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "Does Competition Kill Corruption?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 1001-23, October.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1997. "A Theory of Misgovernance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1289-1332, November.
- Douglas Hibbs & Violeta Piculescu, 2005. "Institutions, Corruption and Tax Evasion in the Unofficial Economy," Public Economics 0508003, EconWPA.
- Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3071, The World Bank.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38750. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.