Rentes et corruption au maroc théorie et evidence
[Morocco rents and corruption theory and evidence]
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; firms; rents; favoritism; competition policy; morocco;
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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