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Why do North African firms involve in corruption ?


  • Clara Delavallade

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


This paper empirically analyzes the main microeconomic determinants of different forms of corruption supply. Our study is based on a new database of near 600 Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian firms. We show that the undeclared part of firms' sales is a major factor of their involvement in administrative corruption. The latter increases with the part of the firm's informal activity as far as it is inferior to 55% of total sales, before slightly decreasing. State capture is rather strengthened by a failing enforcement of property and contract rights. Moreover, both forms of corruption help to compensate a loss of competitiveness, which contradicts previous results on this issue. Finally, we draw a comparison of the factors of corruption in North Africa, Uganda and transition countries and derive policy recommendations.

Suggested Citation

  • Clara Delavallade, 2007. "Why do North African firms involve in corruption ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00143412, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00143412
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
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    3. Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2007. "The not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index," Working Papers 0704, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
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    6. Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. d’Agostino, Giorgio & Dunne, J. Paul & Pieroni, Luca, 2016. "Government Spending, Corruption and Economic Growth," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 190-205.

    More about this item


    North Africa; Supply of corruption; administrative corruption; state capture; informal activity; competitiveness; North Africa.; Corruption active; activité informelle; compétivité; Afrique du Nord; corruption administrative; captation de l'Etat.;

    JEL classification:

    • C2 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm


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