Procurement Auctions with General Price-Quality Evaluation
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References listed on IDEAS
- Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 668-680.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gian Luigi Albano & Berardino Cesi & Alberto Iozzi, 2017. "Teaching an old dog a new trick: reserve price and unverifiable quality in repeated procurement," CEIS Research Paper 404, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 05 May 2017.
- Albano, Gian Luigi & Cesi, Berardino & Iozzi, Alberto, 2017. "Public procurement with unverifiable quality: The case for discriminatory competitive procedures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 14-26.
- Thomas Giebe & Paul Schweinzer, 2015. "Probabilistic procurement auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(1), pages 25-46, March.
- Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh & Mukherjee, Diganta, 2014. "Corruption in delegated public procurement auctions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 122-127.
- Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar, 2014. "Scoring auctions with non-quasilinear scoring rules," ISER Discussion Paper 0902, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Miguel Vazquez & Michelle Hallack, 2017. "Efficiency versus transaction costs in multidimensional auctions: the case of Brazilian oil and gas lease auctions," IEFE Working Papers 94, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Takeshi Nishimura, 2015. "Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 19(2), pages 117-143, June.
- NAKABAYASHI Jun & HIROSE Yohsuke, 2016. "Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model," Discussion papers 16008, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
More about this item
Keywordsscoring auctions; non-quasilinear scoring rules; procurement;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-02-16 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-02-16 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-02-16 (Microeconomics)
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