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The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality

Author

Listed:
  • Gaure, Simen

    () (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Røed, Knut

    () (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

  • Westlie, Lars

    () (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

Abstract

We examine empirically the impacts of labor market policies – in terms of unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) – on the duration and outcome of job search and on the quality of a subsequent job. We find that time invested in job search tends to pay off in the form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. More generous UI raises expected unemployment duration, while improving the quality of the resultant job. Participation in ALMP raises the probability of finding a job and the level of expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaure, Simen & Røed, Knut & Westlie, Lars, 2008. "The Impacts of Labor Market Policies on Job Search Behavior and Post-Unemployment Job Quality," IZA Discussion Papers 3802, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3802
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kohara, Miki & Sasaki, Masaru & Machikita, Tomohiro, 2013. "Is longer unemployment rewarded with longer job tenure?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 44-56.
    2. Nicholas Lawson, 2013. "Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Working Papers halshs-00907807, HAL.
    3. Horny, Guillaume & Picchio, Matteo, 2010. "Identification of lagged duration dependence in multiple-spell competing risks models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 241-243, March.
    4. Bart Cockx & Matteo Picchio, 2013. "Scarring effects of remaining unemployed for long-term unemployed school-leavers," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 176(4), pages 951-980, October.
    5. Bart Cockx & Matteo Picchio, 2012. "Are Short-lived Jobs Stepping Stones to Long-Lasting Jobs?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 74(5), pages 646-675, October.
    6. Rainer Eppel & Helmut Mahringer & Andrea Weber, 2014. "Job Search Behaviour and Job Search Success of the Unemployed," WIFO Working Papers 471, WIFO.
    7. Kyyrä, Tomi & Pesola, Hanna, 2016. "The effects of UI benefits on unemployment and subsequent outcomes: Evidence from a kinked benefit rule," Working Papers 82, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Kyyrä, Tomi & Pesola, Hanna, 2017. "The Effects of UI Benefits on Unemployment and Subsequent Outcomes: Evidence from a Kinked Benefit Rule," IZA Discussion Papers 10484, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. James Kau & Donald Keenan & Constantine Lyubimov, 2014. "First Mortgages, Second Mortgages, and Their Default," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 561-588, May.
    10. Jahn, Elke J. & Rosholm, Michael, 2014. "Looking beyond the bridge: The effect of temporary agency employment on labor market outcomes," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 108-125.
    11. Nicholas Lawson, 2013. "Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," AMSE Working Papers 1357, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised 21 Nov 2013.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    MMPH; timing-of-events; job search; multivariate hazards; NPMLE; job quality;

    JEL classification:

    • C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy

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