Activation against Absenteeism: Evidence from a Sickness Insurance Reform in Norway
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- Hernæs, Øystein, 2018. "Activation against absenteeism – Evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Norway," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 60-68.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsabsenteeism; disability; activation; forkfare;
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EUR-2017-10-01 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HEA-2017-10-01 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2017-10-01 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2017-10-01 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
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