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The case for presenteeism — Evidence from Norway's sickness insurance program

  • Markussen, Simen
  • Mykletun, Arnstein
  • Røed, Knut

Can a work-first strategy control moral hazard problems in temporary disability insurance, and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are assigned graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance for temporary disabled workers.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 96 (2012)
Issue (Month): 11 ()
Pages: 959-972

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:11:p:959-972
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  9. Markussen, Simen & Mykletun, Arnstein & Røed, Knut, 2010. "The Case for Presenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 5343, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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  20. Till von Wachter & Jae Song & Joyce Manchester, 2011. "Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Insurance Program," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3308-29, December.
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  22. Markussen, Simen, 2009. "Closing the Gates? Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Physicians' Sickness Certification," Memorandum 19/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  23. Bratsberg, Bernt & Fevang, Elisabeth & Røed, Knut, 2010. "Disability in the Welfare State: An Unemployment Problem in Disguise?," IZA Discussion Papers 4897, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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