The Case for Presenteeism
Can activation requirements control moral hazard problems in public sickness absence insurance and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are issued graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany|
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org
|Order Information:|| Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Markussen, Simen, 2009. "The Effects of Sick-Leaves on Earnings," Memorandum 20/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Høgelund, Jan & Holm, Anders & McIntosh, James, 2010. "Does graded return-to-work improve sick-listed workers' chance of returning to regular working hours?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 158-169, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5343. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.