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The changing of the guards

Author

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  • Markussen, Simen
  • Røed, Knut
  • Røgeberg, Ole

Abstract

Using administrative data from Norway, we examine the extent to which family doctors influence their clients’ propensity to claim sick-pay. The analysis exploits exogenous switches of family doctors occurring when physicians quit, retire, or for other reasons sell their patient lists. We find that family doctors have significant influence on their clients’ absence behavior, particularly on absence duration. Their influence is stronger in geographical areas with weaker competition between physicians. We conclude that it is possible for family doctors to contain sick-pay expenditures to some extent, and that there is a considerable variation in the way they perform this task.

Suggested Citation

  • Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole, 2013. "The changing of the guards," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1230-1239.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:6:p:1230-1239
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.10.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
    2. Duggan, Mark, 2005. "Do new prescription drugs pay for themselves?: The case of second-generation antipsychotics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-31, January.
    3. Eric French & Jae Song, 2014. "The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 291-337, May.
    4. Markussen, Simen, 2009. "The Effects of Sick-Leaves on Earnings," Memorandum 20/2009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    5. Brekke, Kurt R. & Nuscheler, Robert & Straume, Odd Rune, 2007. "Gatekeeping in health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 149-170, January.
    6. Scott, Anthony, 2000. "Economics of general practice," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1175-1200 Elsevier.
    7. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2003. "Practice variation and physician-specific effects," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 403-418, May.
    8. Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole J. & Gaure, Simen, 2011. "The anatomy of absenteeism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 277-292, March.
    9. Nicole Maestas & Kathleen J. Mullen & Alexander Strand, 2013. "Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(5), pages 1797-1829, August.
    10. Markussen, Simen & Mykletun, Arnstein & Røed, Knut, 2012. "The case for presenteeism — Evidence from Norway's sickness insurance program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 959-972.
    11. Dusheiko, Mark & Gravelle, Hugh & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2006. "The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 449-478, May.
    12. Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole J., 2013. "The Changing of the Guards: Can Physicians Contain Social Insurance Costs?," IZA Discussion Papers 7122, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaute Torsvik & Kjell Vaage, 2014. "Gatekeeping versus Monitoring: Evidence from a Case with Extended Self-Reporting of Sickness Absence," CESifo Working Paper Series 5113, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sick-pay; GP practice styles; Absence certification; Gatekeepers; Family doctors;

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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