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Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration

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  • Alberto Chong

  • Luisa Zanforlin

Abstract

This paper explores the institutional determinants of economic growth in Latin America by taking advantage of recent empirical research that employs subjective and objective measures to test for a possible "Northian" explanation that links institutional quality and economic growth. I provide a framework that helps better understand the policymakers` choices and persistence regarding inward-looking policies that were pursued between the 1930s and the 1980s by arguing that in the Latin American case Olson`s (1982) idea of encompassing interest should be expanded to cover not only the economic stakes of power holders, but also, their political stakes, somewhat along the lines of work by Robinson (1997).

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Luisa Zanforlin, 2001. "Inward-Looking Policies, Institutions, Autocrats, and Economic Growth in Latin America: An Empirical Exploration," Research Department Publications 4255, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4255
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    Cited by:

    1. Calderón, César & Chong, Alberto E., 2006. "Rent Seeking and Democracy in Latin America: What Drives What?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1561, Inter-American Development Bank.
    2. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2005. "Democracy Deficits, Inequality and Pollution. A Politico-Economic Analysis," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-323, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    3. Calderón, César & Chong, Alberto E., 2005. "Do Democracies Breed Rent-Seeking Behavior?," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1557, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    5. Theresa Hager, 2020. "Special Interest Groups and Growth: A Meta-Analysis of Mancur Olsons Theory," ICAE Working Papers 116, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    6. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2007. "Rent Seeking And Democracy: Empirical Evidence For Uruguay," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(3), pages 592-601, July.
    7. Sawyer W. Charles, 2011. "Institutional Quality and Economic Growth in Latin America," Global Economy Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-13, January.
    8. César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Búsqueda de rentas y democracia en América Latina: ¿Qué impulsa a qué?," Research Department Publications 4436, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-355, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
    10. Christian Volpe Martincus & Andrés Gallo, 2009. "Institutions and Export Specialization: Just Direct Effects?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 129-149, February.
    11. Néstor Le Clech & Juan Carlos Guevara-Pérez, 2023. "Latin America and the Caribbean’s Productivity: The Role of Pro-Market Policies, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Natural Resource Endowments," Economies, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-21, May.
    12. Alberto Chong & Alejandro Riaño, 2006. "El entorno político y los precios de las privatizaciones," Research Department Publications 4440, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    13. Alberto Chong & Alejandro Riaño, 2006. "Political Environment and Privatization Prices," Research Department Publications 4439, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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