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Búsqueda de rentas y democracia en América Latina: ¿Qué impulsa a qué?

Author

Listed:
  • César Calderón
  • Alberto Chong

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Este trabajo recoge datos institucionales objetivos no empleados anteriormente para ofrecer elementos de juicio sobre la relación de causalidad que hay entre la conducta de procura de rentas y la democracia en Uruguay, un país donde tanto dichas conductas como los altibajos políticos han variado ampliamente en los últimos 80 años, pero donde la heterogeneidad etnolingüística y la desigualdad del ingreso se han mantenido en niveles bajos por muchísimo tiempo. Esto último ayuda a mejor identificar algunas interacciones políticas "puras" y cómo las mismas se vinculan con resultados de procura de rentas. Descubrimos que la presencia y la duración de los regímenes democráticos parecen haber propiciado una disminución de las conductas de procura de rentas en Uruguay, aunque dicha disminución no parece haber tenido efecto alguno en la calidad del sistema democrático del país. Aunque la duración del sistema democrático puede influir en las conductas de procura de rentas, éstas también muestran una relación de causalidad con la duración de la democracia.

Suggested Citation

  • César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2006. "Búsqueda de rentas y democracia en América Latina: ¿Qué impulsa a qué?," Research Department Publications 4436, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4436
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    References listed on IDEAS

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