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¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?

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  • César Calderón
  • Alberto Chong

    ()

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Empleando datos históricos institucionales objetivos, ponemos a prueba el vínculo existente entre el alcance, la duración y la transparencia en las democracias y las conductas de procura de rentas, empleando enfoques de series temporales y datos de panel. En este trabajo nos concentramos en el caso de Uruguay, un país étnicamente homogéneo. Obtuvimos tres resultados principales. En primer lugar, los regímenes democráticos guardan una vinculación negativa con las acciones de procura de rentas. En segundo lugar, mientras más tiempo haya durado una democracia, menos conductas de procura de rentas exhibirá la sociedad. En tercer lugar, la legislación promulgada con mayor transparencia guarda una correlación negativa con conductas de procura de rentas. Nuestros resultados son valederos con el uso de diversos métodos econométricos y con las pruebas de validez básica, y se corresponden con las teorías imperantes.

Suggested Citation

  • César Calderón & Alberto Chong, 2005. "¿Fomentan las democracias conductas de procura de rentas?," Research Department Publications 4416, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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