Rethinking Governance: Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy
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More about this item
Keywordsgovernance; empirical analysis; corruption; rule of law; accountability; state capture; public policy; public sector management; transparency; indicators;
- E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- K0 - Law and Economics - - General
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
- O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- P0 - Economic Systems - - General
- P5 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAM-2003-08-31 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LAW-2003-08-31 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2003-08-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2003-08-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2003-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
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