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Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Joaquín Vial
  • Cristobal Aninat
  • John Landregan
  • Patricio Navia

Abstract

Este articulo caracteriza los rasgos principales del proceso de diseño de políticas en Chile. El articulo resalta la influencia de las instituciones políticas en dicho proceso y examina la conexión entre el diseño de políticas y el resultado final. Los rasgos principales del proceso de diseño Chileno de políticas son el sistema electoral y el sistema de partidos asociativo, caracterizados por dos coaliciones establecidas, un Ejecutivo poderoso con el control sobre la agenda política, una magistratura independiente, una burocracia que es relativamente libre de corrupción juzgada por los criterios de la OECD, y una serie de vetos en el proceso de diseño de políticas que permiten a facciones afectadas bloquear el cambio de políticas. En consistencia con la estructura teórica de Spiller y Tommasi (2003), el número de actores que interactúan repetidamente y la predictabilidad de la implementación de políticas y una aplicación legal conducen a un proceso de diseño de políticas en el cual los costos de operación son bajos y los intercambios políticos ínter temporales son creíbles. Los grupos de oposición que ejercen su derecho a veto le dan a estos intercambios ínter temporales su credibilidad, aunque también pueden bloquear las reformas. Analizando las políticas desde una perspectiva transversal, encontramos que las políticas en las cuales los intereses de los políticos son mejor representados y las cuales llevan a un cambio exógeno rápido, están asociadas con mas éxito hacia la reforma. En contraste, las políticas que no comparten ningún interés con la rama ejecutiva y con los varios grupos de oposición, tienden a estancarse.

Suggested Citation

  • Joaquín Vial & Cristobal Aninat & John Landregan & Patricio Navia, 2006. "Instituciones políticas, procesos de diseño de políticas y resultados de las políticas en Chile," Research Department Publications 3223, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3223
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    References listed on IDEAS

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