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A Dynamic Discrete Choice Model of blue Collar Worker Absenteeism in Sweden 1991

Author

Listed:
  • Cassel, Claes-M.

    (Department of Economics Statistics)

  • Johansson, Per

    (Department of Economics)

  • Palme, Mårten

    (Department of Economics Statistics)

Abstract

The effect of economic variables on the probability of being absent is studied using panel data for a sample of 1,056 blue collar workers covering day-to-day data for the time period of one year (1991), in all 365,565 observations. Also, the effect of a reform in the sickness insurance on worker absenteeism is studied in some detail. Duration, state dependence and individual heterogeneity are considered. The Slutsky Condition can not be rejected for any individual in the sample and the results show strong economic incentives on worker absenteeism, although the study also shows that the sharp decrease in work absence observed after the reform can not be solely attributed to higher costs of work absence.

Suggested Citation

  • Cassel, Claes-M. & Johansson, Per & Palme, Mårten, 1996. "A Dynamic Discrete Choice Model of blue Collar Worker Absenteeism in Sweden 1991," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 129, Stockholm School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0129
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
    2. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
    3. Per Johansson & Kurt Brafinnafis, 1998. "A household model for work absence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(11), pages 1493-1503.
    4. Barmby, Tim & Orme, Chris & Treble, John, 1995. "Worker absence histories: a panel data study," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 53-65, March.
    5. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bengtsson, Tommy & Scott, Kirk, 2008. "Workplace, Human Capital and Ethnic Determinants of Sickness Absence in Sweden, 1993–2001," IZA Discussion Papers 3672, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Andrén, Daniela & Granlund, David, 2010. ""Waiting for the other shoe to drop": waiting for health care and duration of sick leave," Umeå Economic Studies 814, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    3. Laura Larsson, 2006. "Sick of Being Unemployed? Interactions between Unemployment and Sickness Insurance," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 97-113, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Panel data; sickness insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply

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