IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/han/dpaper/dp-612.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?

Author

Listed:
  • Gassebner, Martin
  • Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik

Abstract

While it is well understood that industrialized countries use aid to grant political favors, little research covers alternative channels such as trade policy towards developing countries. We analyze eligibility investigations and revoking of U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits to see whether political friends of the U.S. receive favorable treatment. While countries politically aligned with the U.S. are equally likely to be investigated, they are significantly less likely to have their benefits suspended.

Suggested Citation

  • Gassebner, Martin & Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik, 2017. "Politicized Trade: What Drives Withdrawal of Trade Preferences?," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-612, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
  • Handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-612
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://diskussionspapiere.wiwi.uni-hannover.de/pdf_bib/dp-612.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 742-757, October.
    2. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.
    3. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588.
    4. Joseph Francois & Bernard Hoekman & Miriam Manchin, 2006. "Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade Liberalization," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 20(2), pages 197-216.
    5. Emanuel Ornelas, 2016. "Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 5823, CESifo.
    6. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 2005. "IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1245-1269, October.
    7. Hoekman, Bernard & Ozden, Caglar, 2005. "Trade preferences and differential treatment of developing countries : a selective survey," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3566, The World Bank.
    8. Emily Blanchard & Xenia Matschke, 2015. "U.S. Multinationals and Preferential Market Access," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 839-854, October.
    9. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
    10. Emily Blanchard & Shushanik Hakobyan, 2015. "The US Generalised System of Preferences in Principle and Practice," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 399-424, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2019. "Foreign in influence and domestic policy: A survey," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1928, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    3. Gnutzmann, Hinnerk & Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan, Arevik, 2020. "The Impact of Trade Preferences Removal," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) dp-663, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zareh Asatryan & Annika Havlik, 2020. "The political economy of multilateral lending to European regions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 707-740, July.
    2. Presbitero, Andrea F. & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "IMF Lending in Times of Crisis: Political Influences and Crisis Prevention," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1944-1969.
    3. Zareh Asatryan & Annika Havlik, 0. "The political economy of multilateral lending to European regions," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-34.
    4. Guimarães, Bernardo de Vasconcellos & Ladeira, Carlos Eduardo de Almeida, 2015. "The determinants of IMF fiscal conditionalities: economics or politics?," Textos para discussão 391, FGV EESP - Escola de Economia de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas (Brazil).
    5. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2015. "Politics and IMF Conditionality," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 59(1), pages 120-148, February.
    6. Facundo Albornoz & Irene Brambilla & Pablo Garriga, 2016. "Exports of Argentina and Brazil under the Generalized System of Preferences," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(74), pages 27-55, December.
    7. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.
    8. Oberdabernig, Doris A., 2013. "Revisiting the Effects of IMF Programs on Poverty and Inequality," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 113-142.
    9. Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs, 2011. "Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation," CESifo Working Paper Series 3581, CESifo.
    10. Luca Papi & Andrea F Presbitero & Alberto Zazzaro, 2015. "IMF Lending and Banking Crises," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 63(3), pages 644-691, November.
    11. Thomas Stubbs & Bernhard Reinsberg & Alexander Kentikelenis & Lawrence King, 2020. "How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 29-73, January.
    12. Lang, Valentin F. & Presbitero, Andrea F., 2018. "Room for discretion? Biased decision-making in international financial institutions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 1-16.
    13. Silvia Marchesi & Emanuela Sirtori, 2011. "Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 287-306, September.
    14. Laurence Allain & Mr. Calixte Ahokpossi & Giovanna Bua, 2014. "A Constrained Choice? Impact of Concessionality Requirements on Borrowing Behavior," IMF Working Papers 2014/176, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Bernhard Boockmann & Axel Dreher, 2011. "Do human rights offenders oppose human rights resolutions in the United Nations?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 443-467, March.
    16. Andone, Irina & Scheubel, Beatrice, 2019. "Once bitten: new evidence on the link between IMF conditionality and IMF stigma," Working Paper Series 2262, European Central Bank.
    17. Silvia Marchesi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2021. "A firm level approach on the e¤ects of IMF programs," Working Papers 476, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2021.
    18. Dumitriu Ramona & Stefanescu Razvan, 2020. "Improving IMF’s Reputation in the Context of COVID-19," Risk in Contemporary Economy, "Dunarea de Jos" University of Galati, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, pages 230-238.
    19. Lang, Valentin, 2016. "The Economics of the Democratic Deficit: The Effect of IMF Programs on Inequality," Working Papers 0617, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    20. Li, Larry & Sy, Malick & McMurray, Adela, 2015. "Insights into the IMF bailout debate: A review and research agenda," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 891-914.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trade Policy; Development; Generalized System of Preferences; United Nations General Assembly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • O24 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Trade Policy; Factor Movement; Foreign Exchange Policy

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:han:dpaper:dp-612. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwhande.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Heidrich, Christian (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fwhande.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.