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CoAccept. Coordination politique et acceptabilité des péages routiers. Rapport final

Author

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  • Pierre Basck

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Charles Raux

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jonas Westin

    (KTH - KTH Royal Institute of Technology [Stockholm])

  • Joel P. Franklin

    (KTH - KTH Royal Institute of Technology [Stockholm])

  • Stef Proost

    (FEB - Faculty of Economics and Business - KU Leuven - Catholic University of Leuven = Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Abstract

Ce projet visait à analyser si la coordination de la tarification routière urbaine, portant sur différents réseaux de transport, entre différentes juridictions conduit à plus d'efficacité et d'acceptabilité politique. La question de la coopération sur la mise en place d'une tarification urbaine entre différents échelons de décision est de plus en plus cruciale dans la mesure où les pays et les régions découvrent son potentiel. Deux aspects de cette recherche sont particulièrement originaux : étudier l'acceptabilité politique d'une tarification routière urbaine dans un contexte local et fédéral (régional) et la tester sur des situations du monde réel. Le projet avait comme objectif d'étudier l'acceptabilité de la tarification routière dans un contexte avec plusieurs entités juridiques sur un même espace (villes, régions ou pays). Il s'agit de la tarification d'une infrastructure qui est utilisée à la fois par du trafic transit et du trafic local. Quand c'est le pouvoir local qui décide, des tarifications trop élevées et insuffisamment d'investissements risquent d'être observés. Une introduction non coordonnée de la tarification routière pourrait avoir des coûts d'efficience élevés et en affecter négativement la faisabilité politique dans d'autres zones géographiques. La plupart des recherches sur le péage urbain ont porté sur l'évaluation de l'efficience économique globale et, parfois, de l'équité des différents programmes. Toutefois, plusieurs introductions prévues ont échoué car les péages ont été rejetés à un stade précoce par les décideurs politiques, ou dans leur phase finale par les électeurs lors de référendums. Par conséquent, la question de savoir comment concevoir et mettre en place un système de tarification routière tel qu'il bénéficie d'une acceptation politique est un sujet de recherche important. Les partenaires de ce projet ont calibré un modèle de transport simple pour une ville et l'ont utilisé pour calculer différents types d'équilibres politiques dans le cas de Lyon. Ces équilibres combinent le vote majoritaire avec des négociations interrégionales. Les scénarios étudiés combinent des péages sur l'infrastructure existante (centre-ville) avec des nouvelles infrastructures (circulaires) ainsi que des clés de répartition pour les coûts des infrastructures. Le réseau de transport est utilisé par plusieurs groupes de voyageurs avec des préférences, types de déplacements et itinéraires alternatifs différents. Comme les segments dans le réseau sont utilisés par ces différents groupes de voyageurs, l'acceptabilité d'un projet varie entre les groupes. Il est supposé qu'une entité juridictionnelle accepte une politique donnée si elle augmente le bien-être d'une majorité qualifiée de la population. A partir du modèle sont étudiées l'acceptabilité politique et l'efficience économique de différentes structures de tarification.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Basck & Charles Raux & Jonas Westin & Joel P. Franklin & Stef Proost, 2012. "CoAccept. Coordination politique et acceptabilité des péages routiers. Rapport final," Working Papers halshs-01707861, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01707861
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01707861
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    References listed on IDEAS

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