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Sharing profit in parallel and serial transport networks

This paper studies the incentives for different countries to cooperate concerning pricing in transport systems, and how to handle the profit from such cooperation. Two types of simple networks with congestion are considered; one with parallel links, and one serial network with a number of consecutive links. The owner of each link tolls the traffic using the link. First the incentives for cooperative behavior among the countries are studied, and shown to be considerable. This is done by using non-cooperative game theory. Second, cooperative game theory is used to analyse solution concepts for allocating the resources raised from cooperation.

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File URL: http://www.transportportal.se/SWoPEc/CTS2011-7.pdf
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Paper provided by CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) in its series Working papers in Transport Economics with number 2011:7.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 02 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2011_007
Contact details of provider: Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Web page: http://www.cts.kth.se/

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. De Borger, B. & Proost, S. & Van Dender, K., 2005. "Congestion and tax competition in a parallel network," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(8), pages 2013-2040, November.
  2. BASSANINI, Anna & POUYET, Jérôme, 2002. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," CORE Discussion Papers 2002017, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. AGRELL, Per J. & POUYET, Jerome, . "Regulatory competition in network interconnection pricing," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2124, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. DE BORGER, Bruno & DUNKERLEY, Fay & PROOST, Stef, 2006. "The interaction between tolls and capacity investment in serial and parallel transport networks," CORE Discussion Papers 2006113, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Verhoef, Erik & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 1996. "Second-Best Congestion Pricing: The Case of an Untolled Alternative," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 279-302, November.
  6. Van Dender, Kurt, 2005. "Duopoly Prices Under Congested Access," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7xw8c3fn, University of California Transportation Center.
  7. David Levinson, 2001. "Why States Toll: An Empirical Model of Finance Choice," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 35(2), pages 223-237, May.
  8. repec:rne:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:1:p:111-135 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Kurt Van Dender, 2005. "Duopoly prices under congested access," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 343-362.
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