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Informational Autocrats

Author

Listed:
  • Sergei Guriev

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR)

  • Daniel Treisman

    (UCLA - University of California [Los Angeles] - UC - University of California, NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research)

Abstract

In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into submission, "informational autocrats" artificially boost their popularity by convincing the public they are competent. To do so, they use propaganda and silence informed members of the elite by co-optation or censorship. Using several sources, including a newly created dataset on authoritarian control techniques, we document a range of trends in recent autocracies consistent with this new model: a decline in violence, efforts to conceal state repression, rejection of official ideologies, imitation of democracy, a perceptions gap between the masses and the elite, and the adoption by leaders of a rhetoric of performance rather than one aimed at inspiring fear.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergei Guriev & Daniel Treisman, 2019. "Informational Autocrats," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03878640, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03878640
    DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.4.100
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03878640
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    Cited by:

    1. Becker, Sascha O. & Mukand, Sharun & Yotzov, Ivan, 2022. "Persecution, pogroms and genocide: A conceptual framework and new evidence," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    2. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Guriev, Sergei & Treisman, Daniel, 2020. "A theory of informational autocracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    4. Luis Guirola & Gonzalo Rivero, 2022. "Polarization contaminates the link with partisan and independent institutions: evidence from 138 cabinet shifts," Working Papers 2237, Banco de España.
    5. Scott Radnitz, 2022. "Perceived threats and the trade-off between security and human rights," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 59(3), pages 367-381, May.
    6. Ananyev, Maxim & Poyker, Michael, 2022. "Do dictators signal strength with electoral fraud?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    7. Choy, James P., 2020. "Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    8. Naudé, Wim, 2023. "Destructive Digital Entrepreneurship," IZA Discussion Papers 16483, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Schulze, Günther G. & Zakharov, Nikita, 2023. "Political cycles of media repression," BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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