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Ramsey, Pigou, heterogenous agents, and non-atmospheric consumption externalities

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  • Ronald Wendner

    () ( Karl-Franzens University Graz)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of non-atmospheric consumption externalities on optimal commodity taxation and on the social cost and optimal levels of public good provision. A negative consumption externality, by lowering the social cost of public good provision, may require the second-best level of public good provision to exceed the first-best level. If those households who are most important for building up the consumption reference level respond the least to commodity taxation, heterogeneity may imply an equity-efficiency tradeoff. This tradeoff is present only if the consumption externality is of the non-atmospheric type.

Suggested Citation

  • Ronald Wendner, 2011. "Ramsey, Pigou, heterogenous agents, and non-atmospheric consumption externalities," Graz Economics Papers 2012-01, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:grz:wpaper:2012-01
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    Cited by:

    1. Wendner, Ronald & Ghosh, Sugata, 2017. "Positional Preferences: Efficiency and Distortions under Welfarist- and Paternalistic Governments," MPRA Paper 77839, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Evangelos V. Dioikitopoulos & Stephen J. Turnovsky & Roland Wendner, 2017. "Dynamic Status Effects, Savings, and Income Inequality," Graz Economics Papers 2017-08, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    3. Van Long, Ngo & McWhinnie, Stephanie F., 2012. "The tragedy of the commons in a fishery when relative performance matters," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 140-154.
    4. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2016. "Inequality Aversion and Marginal Income Taxation," Umeå Economic Studies 939, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    5. Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco & El-Attar, Mayssun, 2012. "Income Inequality and Saving," IZA Discussion Papers 7083, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    6. Eckerstorfer, Paul & Wendner, Ronald, 2013. "Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 42-56.
    7. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2014. "State-variable public goods and social comparisons," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 390-410.
    8. Eckerstorfer, Paul & Wendner, Ronald, 2013. "Asymmetric and non-atmospheric consumption externalities, and efficient consumption taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 42-56.
    9. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2015. "Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: On international tax coordination and social comparisons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 71-86.
    10. Heikkinen, T., 2015. "(De)growth and welfare in an equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 330-340.
    11. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2014. "Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 1-23.
    12. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2016. "Inequality Aversion and Marginal Income Taxation," Umeå Economic Studies 939, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    13. Aronsson, Thomas & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2015. "Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: On international tax coordination and social comparisons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 71-86.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumption externality; Optimal commodity taxation; Pigou; Public good provision; Ramsey rule;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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