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Unconventional Credit Policy in an Economy under Zero Lower Bound

Author

Listed:
  • Jorge Pozo

    (Central Reserve Bank of Peru)

  • Youel Rojas

    (Central Reserve Bank of Peru)

Abstract

In this paper we develop a simple two-period model that reconciles credit demand and supply frictions. In this stylized but realistic model credit and deposit markets are interlinked and credit demand and credit supply frictions amplify each other in such a way that produces in equilibrium very low levels of credit and stronger reductions of the real and nominal interest, so an economy is much closer to the ZLB. However, an unconventional credit policy, that consists on central bank loans to firms that are guaranteed by the government, can undo partially the effects of the credit frictions and prevents the economy from reaching the ZLB. Since central bank loans are not subject to the moral hazard problem between bankers and depositors and are government-guaranteed, credit market interventions rise aggregate credit supply and positively affect the aggregate credit demand, respectively. However, once the economy is at the ZLB the effect of a credit policy is reduced due to a relatively stronger inflation reduction, which in turn reduces entrepreneurs' incentives to demand bank loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Pozo & Youel Rojas, 2021. "Unconventional Credit Policy in an Economy under Zero Lower Bound," IHEID Working Papers 14-2021, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp14-2021
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Unconventional credit policy; asymmetric information; moral hazard; zero Lower bound;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

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