IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gii/giihei/heidwp06-2019.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Smart Development Banks

Author

Listed:

Abstract

The conventional paradigm about development banks is that these institutions exist to target well-identified market failures. However, market failures are not directly observable and can only be ascertained with a suitable learning process. Hence, the question is how do the policymakers know what activities should be promoted, how do they learn about the obstacles to the creation of new activities? Rather than assuming that the government has arrived at the right list of market failures and uses development banks to close some well-identified market gaps, we suggest that development banks can be in charge of identifying these market failures through their loan-screening and lending activities to guide their operations and provide critical inputs for the design of productive development policies. In fact, they can also identify government failures that stand in the way of development and call for needed public inputs. This intelligence role of development banks is similar to the role that modern theories of financial intermediation assign to banks as institutions with a comparative advantage in producing and processing information. However, while private banks focus on information on private returns, development banks would potentially produce and organize information about social returns

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Fernández-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, 2019. "Smart Development Banks," IHEID Working Papers 06-2019, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised 04 Apr 2019.
  • Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp06-2019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/Working_papers/HEIDWP06-2019.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Beck Thorsten & Büyükkarabacak Berrak & Rioja Felix K. & Valev Neven T., 2012. "Who Gets the Credit? And Does It Matter? Household vs. Firm Lending Across Countries," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-46, March.
    2. Danilo Santa Cruz Coelho & João Alberto De Negri, 2011. "Impacto Do Financiamento Do Bndes Sobrea Produtividade Das Empresas: Uma Aplicação Do Efeito Quantílico Detratamento," Anais do XXXVIII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 38th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 119, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    3. Eduardo Fernández-Arias & Charles Sabel & Ernesto H. Stein & Alberto Trejos, 2016. "Two to Tango: Public-Private Collaboration for Productive Development Policies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 94716, February.
    4. Levine, Ross, 2005. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Handbook of Economic Growth,in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 865-934 Elsevier.
    5. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    6. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    7. repec:idb:brikps:7694 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1003-1026, October.
    9. Micco, Alejandro & Panizza, Ugo, 2006. "Bank ownership and lending behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 248-254, November.
    10. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-387, May.
    11. Ricardo Hausmann & Eduardo Fernández-Arias, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?," Research Department Publications 4203, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    12. repec:idb:brikps:publication-detail,7101.html?id=6006 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Micco, Alejandro & Panizza, Ugo & Yanez, Monica, 2007. "Bank ownership and performance. Does politics matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-241, January.
    14. Beck, Thorsten & Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman, 2000. "Finance and the sources of growth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 261-300.
    15. Fernández-Arias, Eduardo & Sabel, Charles & Stein, Ernesto H. & Trejos, Alberto, 2016. "Two to Tango: Public-Private Collaboration for Productive Development Policies," IDB Publications (Books), Inter-American Development Bank, number 7694.
    16. Ricardo Hausmann & Eduardo Fernández-Arias, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment: Good Cholesterol?," Research Department Publications 4203, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    17. Arrow, Kenneth J & Lind, Robert C, 1970. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 364-378, June.
    18. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market Imperfections; Industrial Policy; Public Banks;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • O25 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Industrial Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp06-2019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dorina Dobre). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ieheich.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.