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It's never too late: Funding dynamics and self pledges in reward-based crowdfunding


  • Crosetto, P.
  • Regner, T.


Crowdfunding recently emerged as an alternative funding channel for entrepreneurs. We use pledge-level data from Startnext, the biggest German platform, to gain insights on funding dynamics and pledgers’ motivations. We find that the majority of projects that eventually succeed are not on a successful track at 75% of their funding period. These late successes are boosted by information cascades during the final 25% of the funding duration. We conclude – in contrast with earlier literature – that project success is only partially path-dependent. While early pledges do anticipate project success, a lack of them does not necessarily mean that projects will fail. Interviews and questionnaire responses indicate that projects’ communication efforts play a role in making severely under track projects succeed eventually. Moreover, our dataset uniquely allows us to quantify the extent of self funding. Self pledges account for about 10% of all initial pledges and 9% of all pledges that secure funding. Nonetheless, the late surges at severely under track projects are mostly driven by external funders. Furthermore, we find no evidence of subsequent herding triggered by self pledges.

Suggested Citation

  • Crosetto, P. & Regner, T., 2018. "It's never too late: Funding dynamics and self pledges in reward-based crowdfunding," Working Papers 2018-06, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
  • Handle: RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2018-06

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2014. "Optimal Crowdfunding Design," Working Papers 14-21, NET Institute.
    2. Cason, Timothy N. & Zubrickas, Robertas, 2019. "Donation-based crowdfunding with refund bonuses," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 452-471.
    3. Sardar Muhammad Usman & Farasat Ali Shah Bukhari & Muhammad Usman & Daniel Badulescu & Muhammad Safdar Sial, 2019. "Does the Role of Media and Founder’s Past Success Mitigate the Problem of Information Asymmetry? Evidence from a UK Crowdfunding Platform," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(3), pages 1-24, January.
    4. Eiteneyer, Nils & Bendig, David & Brettel, Malte, 2019. "Social capital and the digital crowd: Involving backers to promote new product innovativeness," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(8), pages 1-1.
    5. Yixiao Li & Zhanda Zhang & Ruiqin Wang & Yuangao Chen, 2019. "Consumer Purchase Intention toward Crowdfunding Products/Services: A Cost–Benefit Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(13), pages 1-21, June.
    6. Andrea Rey-Martí & Antonia Mohedano-Suanes & Virginia Simón-Moya, 2019. "Crowdfunding and Social Entrepreneurship: Spotlight on Intermediaries," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(4), pages 1-23, February.
    7. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Optimal crowdfunding design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Yang Zhao & Xuemei Xie & Liuyong Yang, 0. "Female entrepreneurs and equity crowdfunding: the consequential roles of lead investors and venture stages," International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-29.
    9. Appio, Francesco Paolo & Leone, Daniele & Platania, Federico & Schiavone, Francesco, 2020. "Why are rewards not delivered on time in rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns? An empirical exploration," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    10. Maximilian Goethner & Sebastian Luettig & Tobias Regner, 2018. "Crowdinvesting in entrepreneurial projects: Disentangling patterns of investor behavior," Jena Economic Research Papers 2018-018, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    11. Foster, Joshua, 2019. "Thank you for being a friend: The roles of strong and weak social network ties in attracting backers to crowdfunded campaigns," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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