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Collusion Among Interest Groups : Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation

  • Svensson, J

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of public policy in a developing country in order to explain a number of empirical regularities. It is shown that under certain circumstances, and increase in government revenue will be completly crowded out by incresed rent dissipation, leaving the provision of public goods unaltered.

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Paper provided by Stockholm - International Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 610.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:stocin:610
Phone: +46-8-162000
Fax: +46-8-161443
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  1. Acemoglu, D. & Verdier, T., 1996. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," DELTA Working Papers 96-12, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  2. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
  3. Tornell, Aaron, 1997. " Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 219-50, September.
  4. Mohammad, Sharif & Whalley, John, 1984. "Rent Seeking in India: Its Costs and Policy Significance," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 387-413.
  5. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1995. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 26-52, February.
  6. Joshua Aizenman, 1990. "Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate," NBER Working Papers 3561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  8. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
  9. Klitgaard, Robert, 1989. "Incentive myopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 447-459, April.
  10. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  11. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
  12. Mariano Tommasi, 1995. "Where are we in the Political Economy of Reform?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 733, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Alessandra Casella & Barry Eichengreen, 1994. "Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?," NBER Working Papers 4694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May.
  15. repec:tpr:qjecon:v:98:y:1983:i:3:p:371-400 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
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