Economic Growth and Decline with Endogenous Property Rights
This paper introduces endogenous property rights into a neoclassical growth model. 1t identifies a mechanism that generates growth rates which are increasing at low levels of capital. and decreasing at high levels of capital. The driving force behind changes in property rights is the attempt of each rent-seeking group to secure exclusive access to a greater share of capital by excluding others. We characterize an equilibrium in which there is a shift from common to private property, followed by a switch back to common property.
|Date of creation:||May 1993|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 2, no. 3 (September 1997): 219-250.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
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