On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets
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- L. Lambertini & L. Marattin, 2016. "On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets," Working Papers wp1064, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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More about this item
Keywordsdemand shocks; cyclical pricing; implicit collusion;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-07-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2016-07-02 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2016-07-02 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MAC-2016-07-02 (Macroeconomics)
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