Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate
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- Joshua Aizenman, 1990. "Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate," NBER Working Papers 3561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Buiter,Willem H. & Marston,Richard C., 1986. "International Economic Policy Coordination," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521337809.
- Aizenman, Joshua, 1992.
"Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage,"
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- Joshua Aizenman, 1989. "The Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 2937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Hungarian Reform Process: Visions, Hopes, and Reality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1687-1737, December.
- Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
- Cukierman, Alex & Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "Seigniorage and Political Instability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 537-555, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998.
"Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
- Beetsma Roel M.W.J. & Bovenberg A. Lans, 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Research Memorandum 024, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Discussion Paper 1995-59, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Joshua Aizenman & Gunnar Gunnarsson, 2015.
"Fiscal Challenges in Multilayered Unions: An Overview and Case Study,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 1-20, May.
- Joshua Aizenman & Gunnar Gunnarsson, 2014. "Fiscal Challenges in Multilayered Unions: An Overview and Case Study," NBER Working Papers 20564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is ArgentinaÂ’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 2, pages 169-209, May.
- Mehrdad Vahabi, 2001.
"The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification,"
- Mehrdad VAHABI, 2001. "The Soft Budget Constraint : A Theoretical Clarification," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2001024, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Svensson, J, 1996.
"Collusion Among Interest Groups : Foreign Aid and Rent-Dissipation,"
610, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "Collusion Among Interest Grops: Foreign Aid and Rent Dissipation," Seminar Papers 610, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Joshua Aizenman & Ricardo Hausmann, 1994. "Why is Inflation Skewed? A Debt and Volatility Story," NBER Working Papers 4837, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Qian, Rong, 2012. "Why do some countries default more often than others ? the role of institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5993, The World Bank.
- Valeria De Bonis & Pompeo Della Posta, 2005. "Strategic interactions between monetary and fiscal authorities in a monetary union," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 26, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro.
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