ALTERNATING MONOPOLY AND TACIT COLLUSION -super-
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Luke Garrod & Matthew Olczak, 2017.
"Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms,"
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- Luke, Garrod & Matthew, Olczak, 2016. "Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms," MPRA Paper 70647, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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"Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts,"
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- Cesi Berardino, 2009. "Regulating unverifiable quality by fixed-price contracts," THEMA Working Papers 2009-14, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Liliane Karlinger, 2008. "How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel," Vienna Economics Papers 0803, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
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