Tacit Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring in the Canadian Manufacturing Industry: An Empirical Study
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More about this item
Keywordstacit collusion; game theory; Canada; price war;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
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