IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

How to escape a liquidity trap with interest rate rules

Listed author(s):

I give necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of interest rate feedback rules to eliminate self-fulfilling deflations and all other undesired equilibria in a standard New Keynesian economy with a binding zero lower bound. When the interest rate rule is continuous in the state of the economy, keeping interest rates pegged at zero for a long enough initial period and then switching to a Taylor rule that does not obey the Taylor principle is necessary and sufficient to implement the welfare-maximizing equilibrium in a globally determinate (i.e., unique) way. When the interest rate rule is not continuous, the previous condition is still sufficient but no longer necessary. Fiscal policy is passive, so monetary policy anchors expectations on its own. The interest rate rules I consider do not require central banks to undergo any institutional change and do not rely on the neo- Fisherian mechanism of inducing an increase in inflation by first increasing interest rates..

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr776.html
File Function: Summary
Download Restriction: no

File URL: https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr776.pdf?la=en
File Function: Full text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its series Staff Reports with number 776.

as
in new window

Length: 90 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2016
Date of revision: 01 Dec 2016
Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:776
Contact details of provider: Postal:
33 Liberty Street, New York, NY 10045-0001

Web page: http://www.newyorkfed.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.ny.frb.org/rmaghome/staff_rp/ Email:


References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Benhabib, Jess & Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2001. "The Perils of Taylor Rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 96(1-2), pages 40-69, January.
  2. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Jess Benhabib & Martin Uribe, 2001. "Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 167-186, March.
  3. John H. Cochrane, 2011. "Determinacy and Identification with Taylor Rules," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 565-615.
  4. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2004. "The Magic of the Exchange Rate: Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap in Small and Large OPen Economies," Working Papers 072004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
  5. McCallum, Bennett T., 2009. "Inflation determination with Taylor rules: Is new-Keynesian analysis critically flawed?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1101-1108, November.
  6. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe & Martin Uribe, 2002. "Avoiding Liquidity Traps," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 535-563, June.
  7. Leeper, Eric M., 1991. "Equilibria under 'active' and 'passive' monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 129-147, February.
  8. Woodford, Michael, 1995. "Price-level determinacy without control of a monetary aggregate," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-46, December.
  9. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2012. "The Making Of A Great Contraction With A Liquidity Trap and A Jobless Recovery," NBER Working Papers 18544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Sims, Christopher A, 1994. "A Simple Model for Study of the Determination of the Price Level and the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(3), pages 381-399.
  11. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2014. "Liquidity Traps: an Interest-rate-based Exit Strategy," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(S1), pages 1-14, 09.
  12. Jung, Taehun & Teranishi, Yuki & Watanabe, Tsutomu, 2005. "Optimal Monetary Policy at the Zero-Interest-Rate Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 813-835, October.
  13. Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2009. "Liquidity traps with global Taylor Rules," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 85-106.
  14. Boneva, Lena Mareen & Braun, R. Anton & Waki, Yuichiro, 2016. "Some unpleasant properties of loglinearized solutions when the nominal rate is zero," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 216-232.
  15. Andolfatto, David & Williamson, Stephen, 2015. "Scarcity of safe assets, inflation, and the policy trap," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 70-92.
  16. Andrew Atkeson & Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2010. "Sophisticated Monetary Policies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 47-89.
  17. Jess Benhabib & Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé & Martín Uribe, 2002. "Chaotic Interest-Rate Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(2), pages 72-78, May.
  18. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
  19. Woodford, Michael, 2001. "Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(3), pages 669-728, August.
  20. anonymous, 2009. "Monetary policy report to the Congress," Web Site 46, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  21. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, 09.
  22. Cochrane, John H., 2014. "Monetary policy with interest on reserves," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 74-108.
  23. anonymous, 2009. "Monetary policy report to the Congress," Web Site 70, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  24. Laurence M. Ball, 2014. "The Case for a Long-Run Inflation Target of Four Percent," IMF Working Papers 14/92, International Monetary Fund.
  25. Scott Sumner, 2014. "Nominal GDP Targeting: A Simple Rule to Improve Fed Performance," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(2), pages 315-337, Spring/Su.
  26. Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie & Uribe, Martín, 2012. "The Making Of A Great Contraction With A Liquidity Trap and A Jobless Recovery," CEPR Discussion Papers 9237, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  27. Narayana Kocherlakota, 2016. "Fragility of Purely Real Macroeconomic Models," NBER Working Papers 21866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:776. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Amy Farber)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.