IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Moral Hazard and Capital Requirements in a Lending Model of Credit Denial

  • Eric Van Tassel


Registered author(s):

    In this paper we analyze a repeated game in which an intermediary offers unsecured loans to entrepreneurs using future credit denial to induce repayment. To finance the loans, the intermediary uses a combination of equity capital and external funds. We focus on a moral hazard problem that emerges between the intermediary and the less informed external investors over a costly loan monitoring choice. The presence of informed borrowers in the lender’s portfolio turns out to act as a substitute for capital requirements. The result is that the lending strategy utilized by the intermediary minimizes the moral hazard problem but implies the intermediary’s balance sheet is fragile to exogenous risk.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Vadym Volosovych)

    File Function: First version, 2009
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University in its series Working Papers with number 09003.

    in new window

    Length: 32 pages
    Date of creation: May 2009
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09003
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431
    Phone: (561)-297-3220
    Fax: (561)-297-2542
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    2. Levine, Ross, 2005. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 865-934 Elsevier.
    3. McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1998. "Inter-Firm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," CEPR Discussion Papers 2036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, 1990. "Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Non-Marketable Assets," NBER Working Papers 3551, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cebenoyan, A. Sinan & Strahan, Philip E., 2004. "Risk management, capital structure and lending at banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 19-43, January.
    6. Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, EconWPA.
    7. G. Chiesa, 2001. "Competition and Regulation in Banking," Working Papers 397, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    8. Timothy J. Kehoe & David K. Levine, 1992. "Debt constrained asset markets," Working Papers 445, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    9. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt & David Mayer-Foulkes, 2005. "The Effect of Financial Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(1), pages 173-222, January.
    10. George Pennacchi, . "Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 07-87, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    11. Chiesa, Gabriella, 2001. "Incentive-Based Lending Capacity, Competition and Regulation in Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 28-53, January.
    12. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    13. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 2006. "Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to finance as a growth constraint," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2931-2943, November.
    14. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, 1984. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have," NBER Working Papers 1396, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    16. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicolás S., 1945-, 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Working papers 1523-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    17. Philip Bond & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2004. "Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 681-707, 07.
    18. Ayyagari, Meghana & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2007. "Firm innovation in emerging markets : the roles of governance and finance," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4157, The World Bank.
    19. Berger, Allen N. & Udell, Gregory F., 2006. "A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2945-2966, November.
    20. Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2009. "Borrower runs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 185-191, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:09003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Vadym Volosovych)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.