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Borrower runs

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  • Bond, Philip
  • Rai, Ashok S.

Abstract

Microfinance institutions and other lenders in developing countries rely on the promise of future loans to induce repayment. However, if borrowers expect that others will default, and so loans will no longer be available in the future, then they will default as well. We refer to such contagion as a borrower run. The optimal lending contract must provide additional repayment incentives to counter this tendency to default.

Suggested Citation

  • Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2009. "Borrower runs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 185-191, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:88:y:2009:i:2:p:185-191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Leonardo Becchetti & Stefano Castriota & Pierluigi Conzo, 2012. "Bank strategies in catastrophe settings: empirical evidence and policy suggestions," Econometica Working Papers wp43, Econometica.
    2. Becchetti, Leonardo & Conzo, Pierluigi, 2011. "Enhancing capabilities through credit access: Creditworthiness as a signal of trustworthiness under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 265-278.
    3. Nicolas Krauss & Ingo Walter, 2009. "Can Microfinance Reduce Portfolio Volatility?," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 85-110, October.
    4. Chowdhury, Shyamal & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy & Sengupta, Kunal, 2014. "Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 167-180.
    5. Karna Basu, 2011. "Hyperbolic Discounting and the Sustainability of Rotational Savings Arrangements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 143-171, November.
    6. repec:bis:bisifc:45-08 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Christopher Bidner & Ken Jackson, 2011. "Trust and Vulnerability," Discussion Papers 2012-09, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    8. Hering, Imke & Musshoff, Oliver, 2015. "Dynamic Incentives in Microfinance – What about the Farmers?," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 204673, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association;Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    9. Fabio Schiantarelli & Massimiliano Stacchini & Philip E. Strahan, 2016. "Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency and Borrower Runs: Loan Repayment Delays in Italy," NBER Working Papers 22034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Emilios Galariotis & Christophe Villa & Nurmukhammad Yusupov, 2011. "Recent Advances in Lending to the Poor with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(9), pages 1371-1390, July.
    11. Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2013. "Strategic loan defaults and coordination: An experimental analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 747-760.
    12. Baland, Jean-Marie & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar & Somanathan, Rohini, 2017. "Repayment and exclusion in a microfinance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 176-190.
    13. Malenko, Andrey & Malenko, Nadya, 2015. "A theory of LBO activity based on repeated debt-equity conflicts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 607-627.
    14. Ricardo Serrano-Padial & Lukasz Drozd, 2015. "Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities," 2015 Meeting Papers 1362, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Eric Van Tassel, 2009. "Moral Hazard and Capital Requirements in a Lending Model of Credit Denial," Working Papers 09003, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
    16. Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2017. "Credit Enforcement Cycles," Working Papers 17-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    17. Carrasco, Vinicius & Salgado, Pablo, 2014. "Coordinated strategic defaults and financial fragility in a costly state verification model," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 129-139.
    18. Shapiro, D.A., 2015. "Microfinance and dynamic incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 73-84.
    19. Marc Labie & Carolina Laureti & Ariane Szafarz, 2016. "Discipline and Flexibility: A Behavioral Perspective on Product Design in Microfinance," Working Papers CEB 15-020, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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