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Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

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  • Philip Bond
  • Arvind Krishnamurthy

Abstract

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy—namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances—support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip Bond & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2004. "Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(3), pages 681-707.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:71:y:2004:i:3:p:681-707
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00300.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Philip Bond & Ashok Rai, 2008. "Borrower Runs," Center for Development Economics 2008-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    2. Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2018. "Optimal Exclusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1814, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    3. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia & Thakor, Anjan, 2018. "Warehouse banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 250-267.
    4. Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2023. "On the existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    5. David Croix & Philippe Michel, 2007. "Education and growth with endogenous debt constraints," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(3), pages 509-530, December.
    6. Thomas Philippon & Vasiliki Skreta, 2012. "Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 1-28, February.
    7. Brown, Martin & Serra-García, Marta, 2014. "The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting," Working Papers on Finance 1407, University of St. Gallen, School of Finance, revised Jun 2016.
    8. Bardsley, Peter & Meager, Rachael, 2019. "Competing lending platforms, endogenous reputation, and fragility in microcredit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 107-126.
    9. Martin Brown & Marta Serra-Garcia, 2017. "The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(12), pages 4081-4100, December.
    10. Maria Sarigiannidou & Theodore Palivos, 2012. "A Modern Theory of Kuznets’ Hypothesis," Working Papers 201202, Texas Christian University, Department of Economics.
    11. Eric Van Tassel, 2009. "Moral Hazard and Capital Requirements in a Lending Model of Credit Denial," Working Papers 09003, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
    12. Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, 2015. "Bankruptcy: Is It Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 294-338, November.
    13. Van Tassel Eric, 2017. "Structuring Subsidies in a Long-Term Credit Relationship," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 17(4), pages 1-12, October.
    14. Doherty, Neil A. & Laux, Christian & Muermann, Alexander, 2010. "Insuring Non-verifiable Losses and the Role of Internediaries," Working Papers 11-31, University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
    15. Langberg, Nisan, 2008. "Optimal financing for growth firms," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 379-406, July.
    16. Harold Vásquez & María del Mar Castaños, 2018. "Knowledge, Information, and Financial Decisions: Why Do People Choose to Finance from Informal Credit Markets?," Investigación Conjunta-Joint Research, in: María José Roa García & Diana Mejía (ed.), Financial Decisions of Households and Financial Inclusion: Evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 9, pages 279-308, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, CEMLA.
    17. Neil A. Doherty & Christian Laux & Alexander Muermann, 2015. "Insuring Nonverifiable Losses," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(1), pages 283-316.
    18. Mendizabal Zubeldia, Alaitz & Mitxeo Grajirena, Jone & Zubia Zubiaurre, Marian & Vidal Iturrioz, Joana, 2006. "Banku-etikoa: finantza bazterketaren irtenbide posiblea," Revista de Dirección y Administración de Empresas, Universidad del País Vasco - Escuela Universitaria de Estudios Empresariales de San Sebastián.
    19. Marco Realdon, 2006. "Valuation of the Firm's Liabilities when Equity Holders are also Creditors," Discussion Papers 06/16, Department of Economics, University of York.
    20. Bond, Philip & Rai, Ashok S., 2009. "Borrower runs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 185-191, March.
    21. Marco Realdon, 2007. "Valuation of the Firm's Liabilities When Equity Holders Are Also Creditors," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(5‐6), pages 950-975, June.

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