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Punishment, Reward, and Cooperation in a Framed Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Charles N. Noussair
  • Daan van Soest
  • Jan Stoop

Abstract

We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles N. Noussair & Daan van Soest & Jan Stoop, 2011. "Punishment, Reward, and Cooperation in a Framed Field Experiment," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-12, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2011-12
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    File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2011-12.pdf
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments

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