An Organizational Architecture of T-form: Silicon Valley Clustering and its Institutional Coherence (Formerly 03004)
While referring to a present author's article that compared the J-model vs. A-model as stylized models of Japanese and American firms, O.E.Williamson (1995) suggested the possibility of the third model of organizational architecture referred to T-forms. As examples of the forms, he suggested temporary organizational forms such as joint ventures. In this paper, I formulate the third type of organizational architecture (information capsulated form) which may be naturally derived in contrast to the A-model (hierarchical decomposition) and the J-model (information assimilation form) from an information systemic point of view. Further, I formulate the model of clustering of entrepreneurial firms of Silicon Valley type nesting this third type and analyze its logical structure by which unique values can be created because of its temporariness -- option value and tournament value. Finally, using the game-theoretic framework, I explain reasons why the Silicon Valley model can have institutional coherency and suggest a way to extend the Williamsonian institution-analytic framework.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2004|
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