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Coordination Under Uncertain Conditions: An Analysis of the Fukushima Catastrophe

  • Aoki, Masahiko

    (Asian Development Bank Institute)

  • Rothwell, Geoffrey

    (Asian Development Bank Institute)

This paper analyzes the impacts of the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, which were amplified by a failure of coordination across the plant, corporate, industrial, and regulatory levels, resulting in a nuclear catastrophe, comparable in cost to Chernobyl. It derives generic lessons for industrial structure and regulatory frame of the electric power industry by identifying the two shortcomings of a horizontal coordination mechanism: instability under large shock and the lack of “defense in depth.”

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Paper provided by Asian Development Bank Institute in its series ADBI Working Papers with number 316.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ris:adbiwp:0316
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  1. Aoki, Masahiko, 1990. "Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, March.
  2. Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Masahiko Aoki & Hirokazu Takizuwa, 2013. "Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 7, pages 72-104 Edward Elgar.
  4. Ricardo Alonso & Wouter Dessein & Niko Matouschek, 2008. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization? Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 1195-96, June.
  5. Aoki, Masahiko, 1986. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 971-83, December.
  6. Aoki, Masahiko, 2010. "Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutions," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199218530, July.
  7. Rothwell, Geoffrey, 1996. "Organizational Structure and Expected Output at Nuclear Power Plants," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 78(3), pages 482-88, August.
  8. Bushnell, James & Hobbs, Benjamin & Wolak, Frank, 2009. "When It Comes to Demand Response, is FERC Its Own Worst Enemy?," Staff General Research Papers 13141, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  9. n/a, 2003. "Book Reviews," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 151-159.
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