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Dosahování a narušování institucionální rovnováhy v redistribučních systémech
[Creation and Violation of Institutional Equilibrium in Redistribution Systems]

Author

Listed:
  • Petr Wawrosz

Abstract

Institutional economics is one of the most developing fields of economics. However, many its issues still need to be solved. For instance the theory does not give exact answer to why particular institutions (formal and informal norms) occur, change and cease to exist. The paper tries to solve the topic through the model of establishing and disrupting institutional equilibrium in redistribution systems. People live their whole lives in redistribution systems and they can be members of a winning coalition and receive some redistribution or they are out of coalition and the redistribution is made to their detriment. The members of a winning coalition are not, however, automatically guaranteed ongoing membership. So they have interest to establish a structure of institutions (institutional equilibrium) helping them to protect their position. The paper divides redistribution into two kinds: necessary and unnecessary redistribution. The process of creating a winning coalition in a redistribution system is described and it is shown how institutions help to facilitate the process. Then the paper defines the institutional equilibrium (IEQ) and its conditions. They are explained the connections between IEQ and redistribution systems, the conditions when is convenient for some players endeavour to create a equilibrium, the reasons why IEQ does not occur. The theory of institutional change is hereto used - if somebody endeavours to create a IEQ, (s)he also realizes a institutional change.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Wawrosz, 2011. "Dosahování a narušování institucionální rovnováhy v redistribučních systémech
    [Creation and Violation of Institutional Equilibrium in Redistribution Systems]
    ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2011(4), pages 526-546.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2011:y:2011:i:4:id:803:p:526-546
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Masahiko Aoki, 2004. "An organizational architecture of T-form: Silicon Valley clustering and its institutional coherence," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(6), pages 967-981, December.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12319 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters,in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change Princeton University Press.
    4. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    5. North, Douglass C, 1994. "Economic Performance through Time," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 359-368, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Tomáš Otáhal, 2012. "Ekonomická historie: čím přispívá historický příklad k pochopení ekonomických jevů?
      [Economic History: What Are the Contributions of Historical Example to Understanding of Economic Phenomena?]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(5), pages 679-693.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; institutions; coalition; redistribution systems; desirable and undesirable redistribution; institutional equilibrium; institutional change;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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